Asset  Price Booms, Busts and Financial Crises by Heung, Ting Yin Teresa
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Joseph Wharton Research Scholars Wharton School
2017
Asset Price Booms, Busts and Financial Crises
Ting Yin Teresa Heung
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/joseph_wharton_scholars
Part of the Business Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/joseph_wharton_scholars/28
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heung, T. T. (2017). "Asset Price Booms, Busts and Financial Crises," Joseph Wharton Research Scholars. Available at
http://repository.upenn.edu/joseph_wharton_scholars/28
Asset Price Booms, Busts and Financial Crises
Abstract
While historical market busts and financial crises are usually preceded by asset price booms, booms may not
necessarily be predictive of busts or crises, given the rarity of these adverse events in history. This paper
therefore aims to study the ability of asset price booms in the stock and the housing market to predict asset
market busts as well as financial crises. This paper replicates Goetzmann’s 2015 study of global stock market
bubbles, showing that the probability of a bust conditional on a boom is only slightly higher than the
unconditional probability. Based on empirical evidence drawn from global market data, this paper also
extends the conclusion from the stock market to the housing market, as well as from asset price busts to
macroeconomic financial crises. In other words, stock and housing price booms are not strong indicators of
impending busts or financial crises.
Keywords
asset prices, booms and busts, financial crises, asset bubbles
Disciplines
Business
This thesis or dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/joseph_wharton_scholars/28
 
 
ASSET PRICE BOOMS, BUSTS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 
By 
Ting Yin Teresa Heung 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
heungt@wharton.upenn.edu 
 
 
An Undergraduate Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
JOSEPH WHARTON SCHOLARS 
 
 
Faculty Advisor: 
Jessica A. Wachter 
Richard B. Worley Professor of Financial Management, Professor of Finance 
 
 
THE WHARTON SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
MAY 2017 
 
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
While historical market busts and financial crises are usually preceded by asset price 
booms, booms may not necessarily be predictive of busts or crises, given the rarity of these adverse 
events in history. This paper therefore aims to study the ability of asset price booms in the stock 
and the housing market to predict asset market busts as well as financial crises. This paper 
replicates Goetzmann’s 2015 study of global stock market bubbles, showing that the probability 
of a bust conditional on a boom is only slightly higher than the unconditional probability. Based 
on empirical evidence drawn from global market data, this paper also extends the conclusion from 
the stock market to the housing market, as well as from asset price busts to macroeconomic 
financial crises. In other words, stock and housing price booms are not strong indicators of 
impending busts or financial crises. 
 
Keywords: asset prices, booms and busts, financial crises, asset bubbles 
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INTRODUCTION 
Asset bubbles and financial crises are nothing new in history, as they have been around for 
as long as financial markets have existed. In fact, the first asset bubbles happened even before the 
development of organized stock exchanges, as seen from evidence of a speculative bubble in 
German silver mining shares towards the end of the 15th century (Goetzmann 2015). However, 
even though asset bubbles and financial crises have had a long history, they are relatively rare 
events. For this reason, history plays an even more important role in the study of these rare events. 
The recent global financial crisis in 2008, for instance, was often compared to past crises, such as 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Whenever a financial crisis happens, we have a tendency to believe that “this time is 
different”, claiming that we have learned from past mistakes but the old rules of valuations no 
longer apply, due to reasons such as technological or regulatory innovations (Reinhart and Rogoff 
2009).  Through the studying of the history of financial crises, however, it has been shown that 
past financial crises share certain common precursory features, hence leading some to believe that 
these signs can be used as warning indicators to predict a looming crisis.  
On the other hand, it has also been argued that, history may be misleading due to the small 
sample size of past salient market crashes and financial crises. As economics Nobel laureate Paul 
Samuelson famously claimed, “Wall Street indexes predicted nine out of the last five recessions.” 
Even though crashes or crises usually take place following similar patterns such as market booms, 
those patterns on their own merits may not necessarily lead to crashes.  
This paper therefore aims to study the ability of asset price booms, including booms in the 
stock market and the housing market, to predict asset market busts as well as financial crises. 
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Through an empirical analysis of global stock and housing market data from more than a century, 
this paper finds that the condition of a prior market boom only slightly increases the probabilities 
of market busts and financial crises, compared to the unconditional probabilities of such events. In 
most cases, post-boom markets are found to be much more likely to thrive again than to give back 
its previous gains. In other words, the appearance of market booms does not significantly increase 
the chance of markets crashing or going into crises. Asset price booms are not strong indicators of 
impending busts or financial crises. 
This paper successfully replicates Goetzmann’s finding in the stock market that, while 
bubbles are booms that went bad, not all booms are bad (2015). This paper also extends this 
conclusion from the stock market to the housing market, as well as from market crashes to the 
more macroeconomic financial crises.  
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BACKGROUND 
Definition of Financial Crises 
This paper follows the financial crisis definitions proposed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), 
who use a combination of quantitative thresholds and event-based criteria to define four different 
types of financial crises, which are banking crises, currency crises, inflation crises and sovereign 
debt crises. 
In banking crises, a significant part of a country’s banking sector becomes insolvent due to 
heavy investment losses or banking panics. Currency crises usually occur with the steep 
devaluation of a currency, despite government guarantees to maintain the exchange rate. Inflation 
crises involve high and sudden increases in inflation rates, which would effectively lead to outright 
defaults, since high inflation allows debtors to repay their debts with currency that has a much 
lower purchasing power. Sovereign debt crises occur when a government is unable to repay or 
refinance its external or domestic debt obligations. 
The detailed definitions, thresholds and criteria for each of the crisis types, as well as any 
additional comments or limitations as specified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), are listed in Table 
A1 in Appendix A. 
 
Common Features of Financial Crises 
Even though the different types of financial crises have distinct characteristics, it is 
important to note that they often occur in clusters and are interrelated. Financial crises are also 
closely related to booms and busts in the financial markets. For instance, banking crises and stock 
market crashes are often closely intertwined (Allen and Gale 2007). 
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In addition, most financial crises in history have been found to share the same precursors 
or symptoms. These symptoms include markedly rising asset prices in the stock and housing 
markets, slowing real economic activity as measured by real per capital GDP, large current account 
deficits and sustained central government debt buildups (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). For instance, 
there is usually a massive run-up in equity and housing prices preceding a financial crisis, which 
usually plummet a year after the onset of the crisis. In terms of the trajectory of current account 
balance, current account deficits brought about by accelerating capital inflow are generally 
observed in the years prior to a crisis. Real GDP growth on a PPP basis also consistently show an 
inverted V shape, in which growth momentum falls going into the crisis and remains low for two 
years before going back up again. Increasing public debt has also been found to be an almost 
universal precursor of postwar financial crises. (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008, 2009) 
It has been argued that these signs can be used as warning signals to predict looming 
financial crises. Specifically, it is claimed that many of these red lights were in fact flashing before 
2007, which should have enabled us to foresee that the US was facing a high risk of a deep financial 
crisis, even though these signals may not be able to predict when exactly an asset bubble will burst, 
or the severity of a looming crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). 
 
Not All Booms Lead to Busts 
However, it has also been argued that precursors are not necessarily good predictors. While 
most past financial crises share the same precursory signals, these signals may not always lead to 
crises. In other words, these signals may deliver too many false alarms to somewhat accurately 
predict or serve as effective warning signs of future crises. 
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A study of the booms and busts in worldwide real equity prices over the past century argued 
that history may be misleading because the rarity of past asset bubbles or financial crises only 
allows for a small sample size for inference. We also tend to place a disproportionately large 
amount of attention on a small number crashes (Goetzmann 2015). More specifically, even though 
asset bubbles are conditional upon a market boom, not all market booms lead to bubbles or crashes. 
The probability of a crash conditional on a boom is only slightly higher than the unconditional 
probability of bubbles. Moreover, following a 100 percent price boom, market prices were found 
to be twice as likely to double again, while crashes that gave back previous gains happened only 
about ten percent of the time (Goetzmann 2015). 
In another study of booms and busts in asset prices in post-war OECD, only four out of 24 
boom episodes in stock prices were followed by busts, hence giving a 16.7 percent sample 
probability of a boom ending up in a bust. In property prices, however, 11 out of 20 booms were 
followed by busts, giving a higher probability of a boom ending up in a bust at 55 percent. In other 
words, more than one in two property booms end up in a bust, while only one in six stock market 
booms end up crashing. (Bordo and Jeanne 2002) 
 
Implications 
Research has shown that the probability of rare booms and disasters has significant 
implications on the equity risk premium, as both types of events represent extreme one-sided risks 
that are realized only rarely (Tsai and Wachter 2016). Even a small probability of a substantial 
drop in consumption would cause a significant impact on risk premium and asset prices. The equity 
premium increases with the risk of a disaster, due to the extra compensation required for the risk 
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in assets that fall when there is a high probability of a disaster (Tsai and Wachter 2015). On the 
other hand, a higher possibility of a boom also leads to an increase in the risk premium due to 
higher returns when the boom is realized, which is compensated by lower returns when booms do 
not occur (Tsai and Wachter 2016). 
It is therefore important for long-term investors to understand the probability of a market 
crash or a financial crisis following a boom, which would impact the equity risk premium. By 
focusing too much on avoiding booms that are unlikely to lead to busts, investors forgo the equity 
risk premium and give up higher returns that they can earn on the market during those booms. 
The ex-ante assessment of the likelihood that an economic boom will end up in a market 
crash or financial crisis is also extremely important for regulators, as it has significant implications 
on monetary and fiscal policy. For instance, if asset price booms are found to be robust predictors 
of looming crashes and crises, it will be beneficial to society to proactively restrict monetary policy 
during such booms in order to deflate the bubble and prevent the crisis from happening (Bordo 
and Jeanne 2002). Hence, policymakers face a trade-off between preventing financial crises and 
stimulating economic growth. Having warning signals with high predicting power can thus allow 
them to pursue more proactive monetary and fiscal policy, as well as strike a better balance 
between costs and benefits in the formulation of such policies.  
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ANALYSIS 
Stock Market Analysis 
Data 
For the empirical analysis of booms and busts in the global stock market, this paper mainly 
utilizes of a database of dollar-denominated stock price appreciation indexes constructed by Jorion 
and Goetzmann (1999) (JG). The database contains indexes for 39 countries dating from 1919 to 
1996. The JG indexes are derived mostly from documentary data from the League of Nations and 
the United Nations throughout the 20th century, and include markets that failed or disappeared due 
to reasons such as wars and revolutions (Goetzmann 2015). 
In addition, this paper also makes use of dollar-denominated total return indexes for the 
Saint-Petersburg Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange constructed by the 
International Center for Finance (ICF) at the Yale School of Management. These indexes provide 
stock market return data on the two exchanges in the early 20th century. 
Both the JG and ICF series are augmented with the FTSE dollar-denominated price 
appreciation series available on FactSet, so as to incorporate more recent stock market data from 
the past two decades. In addition, the Russian index from ICF is augmented by recent data from 
S&P Global Equity Indices provided by IFC of the World Bank Group. 
Beyond stock market data, this paper also draws upon a database containing various time 
series of different types of financial crises in 70 countries constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) (RR). The RR time series are yearly tallies of each type of crisis, i.e. banking, currency, 
inflation and sovereign debt (external and domestic) crises, in each country. The definitions of 
each type of crisis as measured by RR are detailed in Table A1 of Appendix A. 
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Table B1 in Appendix B lists the stock markets analyzed in this study, along with the data 
sources, periods, as well as the summary statistics for each market. It should be noted that the stock 
market return series are discontinuous for some of the countries because of the disappearance of 
some markets in the 20th century due to political turmoil, as well as because of the general 
availability of data. In particular, the JG indexes are only available until 1996, while the FTSE 
series for many emerging markets, e.g. countries in South America, Eastern Europe and Asia, only 
begin in 2000, hence leading to a gap between 1996 and 2000 in these markets. For markets known 
to have been expropriated, a negative 100 percent return is included. Another point to note is that 
the financial crisis data for Pakistan, Czech and Israel are unavailable, thus these three countries 
are not included in the financial crisis section of the analysis. 
 
Replication of Goetzmann’s Study (Market Price Analysis) 
This paper first attempts to replicate Goetzmann’s findings on stock market bubbles (2015). 
This analysis computes the probabilities of market booms and busts, in order to examine how the 
condition of a prior market boom changes the probabilities of such market events. 
Definition of booms and busts. Consistent with Goetzmann’s methodology (2015), a 
bubble is defined as a boom followed by a bust. 
A boom is defined in two ways: (1) a single year in which a market increased by at least 
100 percent; (2) a three-year period over which the market increased by at least 100 percent. 
A bust is similarly defined with two time horizons: (1) a decline in market value of at least 
50 percent in the following year; (2) a decline in market value of at least 50 percent over the 
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following five years. Hence, a bust following a boom would require market prices to return to the 
pre-boom level. 
Methodology. To compute the relevant probabilities of market booms and busts, the 
market years under different conditions have to be first counted. Table 1 shows the counts and the 
results for the replication analysis under the one-year 100 percent price boom definition. As 
illustrated in the first horizontal panel of the table, the total unconditional market-years at T=0 are 
first counted in column one, i.e. there is a total of 2,835 market-years in the dataset. In the next 
column under T+1, it is shown that the number of market-year counts drops to 2,766, due to the 
requirement of a prior year return. Among these unconditional T+1 market-years, 57 show a 100 
percent price increase and 71 show a 50 percent price decline. The same process is repeated for 
the five-year horizon in the right-most columns – 2,495 market-years fulfill the requirement of 
having both a five-year return and a single-year return five years prior at T=0. In 495 of these 
market-years the market doubled again, while 179 of them showed a five-year bust in which the 
market value halved. 
The next horizontal panel in Table 1 is only concerned with the market-years that showed 
a 100 percent one-year price increase. Repeating the above process, the analysis counts the market-
years with no conditions, a 100 percent price increase and a 50 percent price decline for both the 
one-year (T+1) and five-year (T+5) horizons. 
With all the market-year counts, the unconditional probabilities of the markets showing a 
100 percent price increase and a 50 percent price decline, as well as the probabilities conditional 
on a prior boom are then computed and presented in the same table. The most relevant probabilities 
are highlighted in blue and will be examined in greater detail in the next section.  
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Table 1 Market-year counts and probabilities of market booms (one-year) and busts in the stock 
market 
 
The same methodology is applied to the three-year boom definition, with the only 
difference being market-years at T=0 being replaced by three-year periods. Complete results for 
both boom definitions with the period counts and probabilities are presented in Tables C1 and C2 
in Appendix C. 
Findings. A summary of the probabilities of booms and busts computed in the stock market 
price analysis is reported in Table 2. Focusing on the top left quadrant of the table, in the one-year 
horizon under the one-year boom definition, the unconditional probabilities of the market doubling 
and halving in value are 2.06% and 2.57% respectively. With the added condition of a one-year 
100 percent price boom in the previous year, the probability of a market boom jumps from 2.06% 
to 13.79%, while the probability of a market bust only increases slightly from 2.57% to 3.45%. 
This means that having a one-year market boom does not significantly increase the chance of a 
bust happening in the following year; in fact, the market is about four times as likely to boom again 
than to crash. 
As the deflation of asset bubbles may take some time, in the five-year horizon, the 
condition of a prior one-year boom increases the probability of the market doubling in value in the 
next five years from 19.84% to 26.79%, while the probability of the market declining 50 percent 
T=0 T+1 T+5
Count Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Market-year counts 2835 2766 -              100.00% 2495 -              100.00%
100% price increase 57 -              2.06% 495 -              19.84%
50% price decline 71 -              2.57% 179 -              7.17%
Years with a 100% price increase 59 58 2.10% 56 2.24%
100% price increase 8 13.79% 0.29% 15 26.79% 0.60%
50% price decline 2 3.45% 0.07% 9 16.07% 0.36%
100% One-Year Price Increase (Dollar-Denominated)
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over the next five years to return to its pre-boom level increases more significantly from 7.17% to 
16.07%. Still, after a 100 percent boom in a year, the market value is more likely to double again 
than to halve over the next five years. 
For the broader three-year definition of a boom, markets halved in value 4.97% of the time 
in the year following a three-year run-up in prices, which is higher than the unconditional 
probability of 2.36%, but a bust is still very rare. In the five-year horizon, the three-year boom 
increases the probability of a subsequent 50 percent decline from 6.98% to 10.33%, while the 
market is still more likely to double in value again over the same period of time with a probability 
of 16.24%. 
Consistent with Goetzmann’s findings in 2015, this analysis shows that a market boom is 
not a strong indicator of a forthcoming bust. While the condition of a prior one-year or three-year 
100 percent price boom increases the chance of a bust in both the one-year and five-year horizons, 
the increase is not very significant and the probability of the bubble bursting and resulting in a bust 
remains fairly low. Moreover, in most cases, a post-boom market is more likely to boom again 
than to bust. In Goetzmann’s words, bubbles are booms that went bad, but not all booms are bad 
(2015). 
Table 2 Probabilities of market booms and busts following one-year and three-year 100% dollar-
denominated price increases in the stock market 
 
1-year horizon (T+1) 5-year horizon (T+5)
Unconditional
Conditional 
on boom
Unconditional
Conditional 
on boom
1-year 100% dollar-denominated price increase (T=0)
100% increase in price 2.06% 13.79% 19.84% 26.79%
50% decline in price 2.57% 3.45% 7.17% 16.07%
3-year 100% dollar-denominated price increase (T=0)
100% increase in price 1.79% 3.97% 19.25% 16.24%
50% decline in price 2.36% 4.97% 6.98% 10.33%
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Extension to Financial Crises (Financial Crisis Analysis) 
Beyond analyzing market price dynamics and asset bubbles, this paper also extends the 
analysis to macroeconomic conditions. Specifically, this analysis examines the effects of the 
condition of a market boom on the occurrence of financial crises. 
Definition of booms and busts. For booms, this analysis follows the same definition from 
the above market price analysis, i.e. a 100 percent price increase in one year or three years. 
However, instead of market price declines, this analysis examines the occurrence of different types 
of financial crises, i.e. banking, currency, inflation and sovereign debt crises as defined in Table 
A1 of Appendix A, following an asset price boom. Note that the four different types of financial 
crisis can occur concurrently. 
Methodology. The methodology of this analysis is very similar to that of the market price 
analysis. However, instead of counting the market-years in which the market declined in value to 
a certain extent, this analysis counts the market-years in which the country is in any type of 
financial crisis. Similarly, when examining post-market boom events, the analysis looks at whether 
the country is in a financial crisis one year and five years after the boom. The complete market 
year counts are presented in Tables C3 and C4 in Appendix C. 
Findings. The relevant probabilities of different types of financial crises are presented in 
Table 3. It is interesting to note that, based on the specified definitions, the RR time series include 
a relatively large number of crisis years, such that over 30 percent of all market-years in the data 
are in fact in crisis. The summary statistics in Table B1 in Appendix B show that this is mostly 
due to the fact that many South American countries, such as Chile, Argentina and Brazil, are very 
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frequently in currency, inflation and debt crises. Banking crises, on the other hand, display a less 
skewed distribution among the countries. 
In most cases, a prior market boom increases the chance of a financial crisis, as compared 
to the unconditional probability of the crisis, but the increase is not highly significant. For both 
inflation crises and sovereign debt crises, the condition of a prior one-year boom causes the 
probability of a crisis to approximately double in both the one-year and five-year horizons; 
however, the observation is not found following a broader three-year boom. Combining all types 
of crises, a one-year 100 percent price boom increases the total crisis probability from 31.06% to 
41.07% over the next year and from 32.61% to 46.15% over the next five years. A three-year 100 
percent price boom increases the crisis probability from 30.15% to 34.53% over the next year and 
from 32.26% to 43.11% over the next five years.  
 
Table 3 Probabilities of financial crises following one-year and three-year 100% dollar-
denominated price increases in the stock market 
  
Note: The definitions of the various types of crises are listed in Appendix A 
1-year horizon (T+1) 5-year horizon (T+5)
Unconditional
Conditional 
on boom
Unconditional
Conditional 
on boom
1-year 100% dollar-denominated price increase (T=0)
Crisis (all types) 31.06% 41.07% 32.61% 46.15%
Banking crisis 10.33% 8.93% 10.67% 17.31%
Currency crisis 15.04% 25.00% 16.10% 15.38%
Inflation crisis 9.46% 25.00% 10.07% 19.23%
Sovereign debt crisis 10.66% 19.64% 11.64% 21.15%
3-year 100% dollar-denominated price increase (T=0)
Crisis (all types) 30.15% 34.53% 32.26% 43.11%
Banking crisis 10.28% 13.67% 10.95% 18.67%
Currency crisis 14.47% 15.47% 16.20% 20.44%
Inflation crisis 8.93% 11.51% 9.78% 12.00%
Sovereign debt crisis 10.07% 12.59% 11.34% 14.22%
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However, in some instances, such as for banking crises in the one-year horizon following 
a one-year boom, the condition of a boom actually decreases the probability of a banking crisis 
from 10.33% to 8.93%. In other words, if the market experienced a 100 percent price increase this 
year, it is actually less likely for a banking crisis to occur next year than when there is no boom. 
The same observation stands for currency crises in the five-year horizon following a one-year 
boom.  
Based on the results of this analysis, while the condition of a stock market boom increases 
the probabilities of most financial crises, it is still not a particularly strong indicator of an upcoming 
financial crisis. Therefore, Goetzmann’s finding that not all booms lead to busts (2015) can be 
extended beyond stock market prices to macroeconomic conditions. Not all booms lead to financial 
crises. 
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Housing Market Analysis 
Data 
In addition to studying stock markets, this paper also examines booms and busts in the 
housing market, as markedly rising housing price is also one of the precursors of financial crises 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). This analysis utilizes a dataset of long-run real residential property 
prices in 23 countries, which include 18 advanced economies and five emerging economies, 
beginning as early as 1947 but for most countries from 1970 onwards. This dataset is constructed 
from nominal residential property prices compiled by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
from various national sources, deflated by consumer price indexes also provided by the BIS. In 
the dataset, 1995 prices are set to be 100 units. 
Similar to the stock market analysis, this analysis also draws upon the RR financial crises 
time series for the countries present in the housing price database. Table B2 in Appendix B lists 
the housing markets analyzed in this study, along with the data source, periods, as well as the 
summary statistics for each market. Note that the financial crisis data for Hong Kong are 
unavailable in the RR time series, thus Hong Kong is not included in the financial crisis analysis 
section. 
 
Market Price Analysis 
Definition of booms and busts. For the market price analysis of housing prices, a boom 
is defined in three ways: (1) a single year in which a market increased by at least 40 percent; (2) a 
three-year period over which the market increased by at least 40 percent; (3) a five-year period 
over which the market increased by at least 40 percent. 
 
18 
 
The threshold for a boom in the housing market is lower than that of the stock market 
because the housing market is less volatile than the stock market. In addition, the housing price 
data are in real terms, while the stock price data are in US dollar terms. Therefore, the threshold 
for a boom is set at 40 percent in this housing market analysis, as opposed to 100 percent in the 
stock market analysis. In addition, there is an extra time horizon of five years when compared to 
the stock market analysis, as housing prices are less volatile and take longer to boom. 
A bust is similarly defined with three time horizons: (1) a decline in market value of at 
least 29 percent in the following year; (2) a decline in market value of at least 29 percent over the 
following three years; (3) a decline in market value of at least 29 percent over the following five 
years.  
The 29 percent decline is determined based on the requirement for post-boom market prices 
to return to their pre-boom level in the deflation of a bubble. Similar to booms, when compared to 
the stock market price analysis, there is an extra time horizon of three years. This is because, as 
mentioned above, housing markets are less volatile and bubbles would take longer to deflate. 
Methodology. The methodology of this analysis follows the same framework as that of the 
stock market price analysis, i.e. the Goetzmann replication, with only changes in the definitions of 
booms and busts. The market-year and period counts used in the computations of the probabilities 
are presented in Tables D1, D2 and D3 in Appendix D. 
Findings. The unconditional and conditional probabilities of booms and busts in the 
housing market are presented in Table 4. The table shows that not much can be inferred from the 
one-year boom and the one-year horizon conditions, as there are extremely few or no counts of 
booms or busts under those conditions. 
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Table 4 Probabilities of market booms and busts following one-year, three-year and five-year 
40% real price increases in the housing market 
 
However, the three-year and five-year conditions display similar findings as the earlier 
stock market price analysis in this paper. In the three-year period following a three-year 40 percent 
real price increase, the probability of a bust in which market prices return to the pre-boom value 
increases from 2.01% unconditionally to 5.88%, which is still a rare occurrence. However, the 
market is around three times as likely to undergo a 40 percent price boom again, with a conditional 
probability of 15.69%. In the five years following a three-year boom, the probability of a bust 
increases from 4.14% unconditionally to 10.20%, while another boom is still more likely at 
16.33%. 
The broader five-year boom definition also leads to comparable results. In the three-year 
horizon, a boom increases the chance of a bust from 2.14% to 6.84%, while the market is more 
likely to undergo a three-year 40 percent price boom with a 9.40% probability. Over the five-year 
horizon, a boom raises the probability of a bust from 4.13% to 8.25%, still much lower compared 
to the 19.59% chance that the market would experience another five-year boom. 
1-year horizon (T+1) 3-year horizon (T+3) 5-year horizon (T+5)
Unconditional
Conditional 
on boom
Unconditional
Conditional 
on boom
Unconditional
Conditional 
on boom
1-year 40% real price increase (T=0)
40% increase in price 0.11% 0.00% 5.83% 0.00% 14.84% 0.00%
29% decline in price 0.11% 0.00% 2.14% 0.00% 4.15% 0.00%
3-year 40% real price increase (T=0)
40% increase in price 0.12% 0.00% 5.66% 15.69% 14.95% 16.33%
29% decline in price 0.12% 0.00% 2.01% 5.88% 4.14% 10.20%
5-year 40% real price increase (T=0)
40% increase in price 0.13% 0.83% 5.47% 9.40% 15.08% 19.59%
29% decline in price 0.13% 0.00% 2.14% 6.84% 4.13% 8.25%
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This analysis demonstrates that Goetzmann’s findings apply not only to the stock market, 
but also to the housing market. While a boom in housing prices increases the probability of a bust, 
the probability of a bust occurring remains low at between 5.88% and 10.20% under different 
conditions. On the other hand, the post-boom market is much more likely to experience another 
boom. Therefore, booms in housing prices are not good indicators of busts in housing prices. In 
most instances, the housing market does not give back its previous gain from a boom. 
 
Financial Crisis Analysis 
Definition of booms and busts. This paper also extends the financial crisis analysis on the 
stock market to the housing market. This analysis uses the definition for market booms as the 
above housing market price analysis, i.e. 40 percent real price increase in one, three or five years. 
Similar to the financial crisis analysis on the stock market, this analysis examines the 
occurrence of the four different types of financial crises measured in the RR time series instead of 
market price declines.  
Methodology. The methodology of this analysis follows the same framework as that of the 
stock market analysis, with the definition of market booms and the time horizons being the only 
changed factors, in addition to the underlying data. The market-years or periods in which the 
country is in any type of financial crisis are counted under the different conditions. For instance, 
the market-years or periods in a financial crisis one, three and five years after a market boom are 
counted. The complete market-year and period counts used in the computations of the probabilities 
are provided in Tables D4, D5 and D6 in Appendix D. 
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Findings. Table 5 shows the relevant unconditional and conditional probabilities of the 
different types of financial crises. As there is no instance of a one-year 40 percent real price boom 
in any market-year, not much can be inferred from the one-year boom panel and this paper will 
focus on the three-year and five-year price booms. 
A particularly interesting finding from the table is that the probabilities of banking crises 
decrease significantly in the year following a boom (T+1), from 16.24% to 2.17% after a three-
year boom and from 17.04% to 9.17% after a five-year boom. This means that the occurrence of a 
housing price boom makes it a few times less likely for a banking crisis to take place in the 
following year. 
Table 5 Probabilities of financial crises following one-year, three-year and five-year 40% real 
price increases in the housing market 
  
Note: The definitions of the various types of crises are listed in Appendix A 
1-year horizon (T+1) 3-year horizon (T+3) 5-year horizon (T+5)
Unconditional
Conditional 
on boom
Unconditional
Conditional 
on boom
Unconditional
Conditional 
on boom
1-year 40% real price increase (T=0)
Crisis (all types) 23.57% NA 24.85% NA 25.49% NA
Banking crisis 15.40% NA 16.24% NA 17.04% NA
Currency crisis 8.52% NA 8.98% NA 9.10% NA
Inflation crisis 1.17% NA 1.23% NA 0.91% NA
Sovereign debt crisis 0.58% NA 0.62% NA 0.65% NA
3-year 40% real price increase (T=0)
Crisis (all types) 24.85% 13.04% 25.49% 30.43% 24.97% 40.91%
Banking crisis 16.24% 2.17% 17.04% 21.74% 17.10% 25.00%
Currency crisis 8.98% 8.70% 9.10% 10.87% 8.28% 13.64%
Inflation crisis 1.23% 2.17% 0.91% 2.17% 0.55% 4.55%
Sovereign debt crisis 0.62% 0.00% 0.65% 0.00% 0.69% 0.00%
5-year 40% real price increase (T=0)
Crisis (all types) 25.49% 20.18% 24.97% 34.26% 25.26% 33.71%
Banking crisis 17.04% 9.17% 17.10% 23.15% 16.89% 22.47%
Currency crisis 9.10% 11.01% 8.28% 12.96% 8.37% 11.24%
Inflation crisis 0.91% 0.92% 0.55% 1.85% 0.59% 2.25%
Sovereign debt crisis 0.65% 0.00% 0.69% 0.93% 0.73% 0.00%
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 However, such an observation cannot be made in the three-year and five-year horizons 
post-boom. In these two timeframes, the analysis finds the usual observation: while the condition 
of a prior market boom increases the probability of a crisis taking place in the following three or 
five years, the increase is not very significant. Aggregating all types of crises, a three-year 40 
percent price boom increases the total crisis probability from 25.49% to 30.43% over the next three 
years and from 24.97% to 40.91% over the next five years. A five-year 40 percent price boom 
increases the crisis probability from 24.97% to 34.26% over the next three years and from 25.26% 
to 33.71% over the next five years.  
Therefore, this analysis presents a similar conclusion as the other analyses on the stock and 
housing markets in this paper – housing market price booms are not particularly robust indicators 
of financial crises.   
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CONCLUSION 
While most analyses done on asset bubbles and financial crises focus on a small number 
of well-known events in history, this paper presents empirical evidence from long-run global stock 
and housing markets to argue that asset price booms are weak indicators of impending busts or 
financial crises. This paper successfully replicates Goetzmann’s finding from his 2015 study of 
global stock market bubbles that the probability of a bust conditional on a boom is only slightly 
higher than the unconditional probability (2015), and extends this conclusion from the stock 
market to the housing market, as well as from asset price busts to macroeconomic financial crises. 
While busts and financial crises tend to be preceded by booms, not all booms will lead to busts or 
crises. 
This finding has significant implications for investors and regulators. For investors, while 
booms do slightly increase the chance of an upcoming bust or financial crisis, it may be even more 
notable that after a boom the market is more likely to boom again than to bust. For regulators who 
face a trade-off between fending off a financial crisis and stimulating economic growth, the 
findings of this paper may caution against overly proactive monetary policies that preemptively 
deflate asset price bubbles. Such policies, which aim at preventing market crashes or financial 
crises, would more likely cause the market to forgo another boom rather than a bust.  
This paper analyzes the ability of asset price booms to anticipate market busts and financial 
crises. Aside from asset price booms, there are also other factors identified as common patterns in 
the run-up to historical financial crises, such as large current account deficits, slowing real GDP 
growth and buildup of real central government debt (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). For future 
research, it would be interesting to conduct empirical analyses on the ability of these 
macroeconomic factors to predict financial crises, using a methodology similar to that employed 
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in this paper, which takes into account extensive global historical data, as opposed to only focusing 
on a relatively small number of financial crises throughout history. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1: Definitions of different types of financial crisis by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
Type of Crisis Definition (Threshold/ Criteria) Comments
Inflation crisis An annual inflation rate of 20 percent or higher. 
We also examine separately the incidence of 
more extreme cases where inflation exceeds 40 
percent per annum.
Currency crisis An annual depreciation versus the US dollar (or 
the relevant anchor currency – historically the 
UK pround, the French franc, or the German 
DM and presently the euro) of 15 percent or 
more.
Banking crisis We mark a banking crisis by two types of 
events: (1) bank runs that lead to the closure, 
merging, or takeover by the public sector of one 
of more financial institutions; and (2) if there are 
no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-
scale government assistance of an important 
financial institution (or group of institutions), that 
marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for 
other financial institutions.
This approach to dating the beginning of a 
banking crisis is not without drawbacks. It could 
date a crisis too late, because the financial 
problems usually begin well before a bank is 
finally closed or merged; it could also date a 
crisis too early, because the worst part of a crisis 
may come later. Unlike the external debt crises 
(see below), which have well-defined closure 
dates, it is often difficult or impossible to 
accurately pinpoint the year in which a crisis 
ended.
Debt crisis: 
External
A sovereign default is defined as the failure to 
meet a principal or interest payment on the due 
date (or within the specified grace period). The 
episodes also include instances where 
rescheduled debt is ultimately extinguished in 
terms less favorable than the original obligation.
While the time of default is accurately classified 
as a crisis year, there are a large number of 
cases where the final resolution with the creditors 
(if it ever did take place) seems interminable. For 
this reason we also work with a crisis dummy 
that only picks up the first year.
Debt crisis: 
Domestic
The defintion given above for external debt 
applies. In addition, domestic debt crises have 
invilved the freezing of bank deposits and/ or 
forcible conversions of such deposits from 
dollars to local currency.
There is at best some partial documentation of 
recent defaults on domestic debt provided by 
Standard and Poors. Historically, it is very 
difficult to date these episodes and in many cases 
(like banking crises) it is impossible to ascertain 
the date of the final resolution.
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Table B1: Summary statistics for global stock markets 
 
1 Year Return Market 1Y 100% Crisis Years
Country Source Period Mean Std. Max Min Years Booms All Banking Currency Inflation Debt
Chile JG FTSE 1927-1996, 2000-2016 0.12 0.39 1.18 -0.53 76 3 57 5 35 33 30
Argentina JG FTSE 1947-1996, 2000-2016 0.22 0.99 4.55 -0.86 55 5 51 10 32 33 30
Colombia JG FTSE 1936-1996, 2000-2016 0.08 0.38 1.88 -0.55 70 3 41 6 21 23 8
Germany JG FTSE 1919-2016 0.14 0.55 4.41 -0.75 91 3 40 9 12 4 22
Brazil JG FTSE 1961-2016 0.19 0.60 2.32 -0.70 49 4 37 7 33 31 14
Mexico JG FTSE 1934-2016 0.13 0.36 1.15 -0.79 76 1 35 9 17 19 17
Spain JG FTSE 1919-2016 0.05 0.37 1.43 -1.78 84 2 32 19 16 1 4
US JG FTSE 1919-2016 0.08 0.20 0.76 -0.47 91 0 31 17 18 0 1
Japan JG FTSE 1919-2016 0.07 0.34 1.67 -0.93 91 2 30 13 9 6 11
France JG FTSE 1919-2016 0.07 0.30 0.88 -0.61 89 0 27 9 15 10 0
UK JG FTSE 1919-2016 0.07 0.25 1.07 -0.53 91 1 27 9 13 2 8
China ICF FTSE 1900-1941, 2000-2016 0.08 0.33 1.20 -1.00 51 1 27 11 13 7 19
Peru JG FTSE 1941-1952, 1957-1977, 1988-1996, 2000-2016 0.13 0.47 2.23 -0.71 49 3 24 2 10 11 20
India JG FTSE 1939-1996, 2000-2016 0.06 0.27 0.94 -0.63 67 0 21 6 7 4 7
Philippines JG FTSE 1954-2016 0.12 0.84 6.21 -0.61 56 1 21 12 7 4 12
Venezuela JG 1937-1996 0.08 0.56 3.90 -0.76 59 1 20 11 11 11 9
Italy JG FTSE 1928-2016 0.08 0.37 1.51 -0.84 76 4 17 9 5 5 2
South Africa JG FTSE 1947-2016 0.06 0.27 0.83 -0.43 63 0 17 3 11 0 5
Australia JG FTSE 1931-2016 0.09 0.23 0.99 -0.53 79 0 16 5 10 3 0
Austria JG FTSE 1925-2016 0.10 0.37 1.94 -0.69 76 2 14 5 6 4 8
Finland JG FTSE 1931-2016 0.12 0.38 1.46 -0.62 79 3 14 5 8 5 0
Denmark JG FTSE 1926-2016 0.08 0.23 1.02 -0.49 84 1 13 10 3 1 0
Ireland JG FTSE 1934-2016 0.08 0.27 0.99 -0.72 76 0 13 4 7 2 0
Sweden JG FTSE 1919-2016 0.09 0.26 0.74 -0.58 91 0 13 8 6 0 0
Greece JG FTSE 1929-1930, 1932-1939, 1999-2016 0.05 0.67 2.74 -0.67 19 1 13 3 4 0 7
Poland JG FTSE 1921-1938, 2000-2016 0.07 0.45 1.12 -1.00 28 1 13 3 4 3 8
Belgium JG FTSE 1920-2016 0.07 0.27 1.27 -0.62 88 1 12 8 4 2 0
Norway JG FTSE 1928-2016 0.09 0.30 1.00 -0.64 78 1 12 8 4 0 0
New Zealand JG FTSE 1931-2016 0.07 0.26 1.24 -0.53 79 1 11 4 6 0 1
Portugal JG FTSE 1930-1973, 1977-2016 0.12 0.47 1.98 -0.52 74 6 10 5 5 3 0
Hungary JG FTSE 1925-1930, 1932-1940, 2000-2016 0.10 0.41 0.92 -1.00 24 0 10 3 2 0 6
Netherlands JG FTSE 1919-2016 0.06 0.22 0.66 -0.54 91 0 9 5 4 0 0
Russia ICF IFC 1900-1914, 1997-2015 0.16 0.66 2.84 -1.00 27 2 8 3 4 5 3
Canada JG FTSE 1919-2016 0.08 0.24 1.34 -0.49 91 1 7 4 2 0 1
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Table B1 (continued): Summary statistics for global stock markets 
 
 
Return data sources: (1) JG: Dollar-denominated stock price appreciation indexes constructed by Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) 
(2) ICF: Dollar-denominated total return indexes for the Saint-Petersburg Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange constructed 
by the International Center for Finance at the Yale School of Management 
(3) FTSE: FTSE dollar-denominated price appreciation series available on FactSet 
(4) IFC: S&P Global Equity Indices provided by IFC of the World Bank Group 
Crisis year data source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
1 Year Return Market 1Y 100% Crisis Years
Country Source Period Mean Std. Max Min Years Booms All Banking Currency Inflation Debt
Switzerland JG FTSE 1926-2016 0.09 0.22 1.06 -0.34 84 1 6 3 3 0 0
Romania JG 1937-1940 -0.40 0.48 0.02 -1.00 4 0 4 0 1 0 4
Uruguay JG 1936-1943 0.10 0.21 0.32 -0.26 7 0 3 0 2 0 2
Egypt JG FTSE 1950-1961, 2000-2016 0.12 0.44 1.26 -0.62 21 2 2 0 2 0 0
Pakistan JG FTSE 1960-1996, 2000-2016 0.08 0.33 1.18 -0.72 46 1 NA NA NA NA NA
Czech JG FTSE 1920-1944, 2000-2016 0.10 0.37 1.13 -1.00 35 1 NA NA NA NA NA
Israel JG FTSE 1957-1996, 2000-2016 0.12 0.35 0.86 -0.70 49 0 NA NA NA NA NA
Average 0.08 0.39 1.61 -0.70 63.76 1.44 19.95 6.66 9.79 6.11 6.82
Median 0.08 0.36 1.18 -0.64 76 1 15 6 7 3 4
Standard Deviation 0.09 0.17 1.22 0.25 25.69 1.48 13.23 4.33 8.60 9.33 8.35
Min -0.40 0.20 0.02 -1.78 4 0 2 0 1 0 0
Max 0.22 0.99 6.21 -0.26 91 6 57 19 35 33 30
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 Table B2: Summary statistics for global housing markets 
 
Return data sources: National sources, BIS Residential Property Price database, www.bis.org/statistics/pp.htm 
Crisis year data source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)  
1 Year Return Market Crisis Years
Country Source Period Mean Std. Max Min Years All Banking Currency Inflation Debt
United States BIS 1971-2010 0.01 0.06 0.12 -0.18 40 16 12 4 0 0
South Africa BIS 1967-2010 0.02 0.10 0.30 -0.21 44 16 3 10 0 5
Korea BIS 1976-2010 0.01 0.09 0.29 -0.16 35 15 11 4 2 0
Spain BIS 1972-2010 0.04 0.09 0.29 -0.13 39 14 12 4 1 0
UK BIS 1969-2010 0.04 0.10 0.33 -0.16 42 13 9 7 1 0
Japan BIS 1956-2010 0.04 0.09 0.27 -0.15 55 13 10 2 1 0
Australia BIS 1971-2010 0.03 0.07 0.24 -0.10 40 11 4 6 1 0
Ireland BIS 1971-2010 0.03 0.09 0.20 -0.15 40 11 4 5 2 0
Germany BIS 1971-2010 -0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.05 40 10 6 4 0 0
Italy BIS 1948-2010 0.02 0.06 0.21 -0.07 63 10 6 3 2 0
Norway BIS 1971-2010 0.03 0.08 0.22 -0.17 40 10 7 3 0 0
Denmark BIS 1971-2010 0.02 0.09 0.23 -0.17 40 9 9 1 0 0
New Zealand BIS 1971-2010 0.03 0.08 0.22 -0.12 40 9 4 5 0 0
Sweden BIS 1971-2010 0.02 0.07 0.12 -0.17 40 8 4 5 0 0
France BIS 1971-2010 0.03 0.05 0.14 -0.05 40 7 5 2 0 0
Thailand BIS 1992-2010 -0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.08 19 6 6 2 0 0
Belgium BIS 1971-2010 0.03 0.06 0.13 -0.11 40 5 3 2 0 0
Malaysia BIS 1989-2010 0.03 0.06 0.17 -0.12 22 5 5 1 0 0
Canada BIS 1971-2010 0.03 0.07 0.19 -0.16 40 4 3 1 0 0
Switzerland BIS 1971-2010 0.01 0.05 0.14 -0.09 40 4 2 2 0 0
Finland BIS 1971-2010 0.02 0.10 0.33 -0.21 40 4 4 1 0 0
Netherlands BIS 1971-2010 0.03 0.09 0.24 -0.20 40 4 3 1 0 0
Hong Kong BIS 1980-2010 0.04 0.17 0.41 -0.37 31 NA NA NA NA NA
Average 0.02 0.08 0.21 -0.15 39.57 9.27 6.00 3.41 0.45 0.23
Median 0.03 0.08 0.22 -0.15 40 10 5 3 0 0
Standard Deviation 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.07 8.64 4.06 3.13 2.30 0.74 1.07
Min -0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.37 19 4 2 1 0 0
Max 0.04 0.17 0.41 -0.05 63 16 12 10 2 5
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APPENDIX C 
Table C1: Market year counts and probabilities of market booms (one-year) and busts in the stock market 
 
 
T=0 T+1 T+5
Count Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Market-year counts 2835 2766 -              100.00% 2495 -              100.00%
100% price increase 57 -              2.06% 495 -              19.84%
50% price decline 71 -              2.57% 179 -              7.17%
Years with a 100% price increase 59 58 2.10% 56 2.24%
100% price increase 8 13.79% 0.29% 15 26.79% 0.60%
50% price decline 2 3.45% 0.07% 9 16.07% 0.36%
Years with a 50% price decline 72 66 2.39% 57 2.28%
100% price increase 10 15.15% 0.36% 19 33.33% 0.76%
50% price decline 4 6.06% 0.14% 5 8.77% 0.20%
100% One-Year Price Increase (Dollar-Denominated)
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Table C2: Market year counts and probabilities of market booms (three-year) and busts in the stock market 
 
T=0 T+1 T+5
Count Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Three-year period counts 2695 2628 -              100.00% 2364 -              100.00%
100% price increase 47 -              1.79% 455 -              19.25%
50% price decline 62 -              2.36% 165 -              6.98%
Three-year periods with a 100% price increase 303 302 11.49% 271 11.46%
100% price increase 12 3.97% 0.46% 44 16.24% 1.86%
50% price decline 15 4.97% 0.57% 28 10.33% 1.18%
Three-year periods with a 50% price decline 154 144 5.48% 129 5.46%
100% price increase 9 6.25% 0.34% 64 49.61% 2.71%
50% price decline 3 2.08% 0.11% 9 6.98% 0.38%
100% Three-Year Price Increase (Dollar-Denominated)
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Table C3: Market year counts and probabilities of market booms (one-year) and financial crises in the stock market 
 
  
T=0 T+1 T+5
Count Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Market-year counts 2484 2421 -              100.00% 2174 -              100.00%
100% price increase 55 -              2.27% 455 -              20.93%
Crisis (all types) 752 -              31.06% 709 -              32.61%
Banking crisis 250 -              10.33% 232 10.67%
Currency crisis 364 -              15.04% 350 16.10%
Inflation crisis 229 -              9.46% 219 10.07%
Sovereign debt crisis 258 -              10.66% 253 11.64%
Years with a 100% price increase 57 56 2.31% 52 2.39%
100% price increase 8 14.29% 0.33% 14 26.92% 0.64%
Crisis (all types) 23 41.07% 0.95% 24 46.15% 1.10%
Banking crisis 5 8.93% 0.21% 9 17.31% 0.41%
Currency crisis 14 25.00% 0.58% 8 15.38% 0.37%
Inflation crisis 14 25.00% 0.58% 10 19.23% 0.46%
Sovereign debt crisis 11 19.64% 0.45% 11 21.15% 0.51%
100% One-Year Price Increase (Dollar-Denominated)
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Table C4: Market year counts and probabilities of market booms (three-year) and financial crises in the stock market 
 
 
  
T=0 T+1 T+5
Count Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Three-year period counts 2356 2295 -              100.00% 2055 -              100.00%
100% price increase 47 -              2.05% 422 -              20.54%
Crisis (all types) 692 -              30.15% 663 -              32.26%
Banking crisis 236 -              10.28% 225 -              10.95%
Currency crisis 332 -              14.47% 333 -              16.20%
Inflation crisis 205 -              8.93% 201 -              9.78%
Sovereign debt crisis 231 -              10.07% 233 -              11.34%
Three-year periods with a 100% price increase 279 278 12.11% 225 10.95%
100% price increase 12 4.32% 0.52% 42 18.67% 2.04%
Crisis (all types) 96 34.53% 4.18% 97 43.11% 4.72%
Banking crisis 38 13.67% 1.66% 42 18.67% 2.04%
Currency crisis 43 15.47% 1.87% 46 20.44% 2.24%
Inflation crisis 32 11.51% 1.39% 27 12.00% 1.31%
Sovereign debt crisis 35 12.59% 1.53% 32 14.22% 1.56%
100% Three-Year Price Increase (Dollar-Denominated)
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APPENDIX D 
Table D1: Market year counts and probabilities of market booms (one-year) and busts in the housing market 
 
 
Table D2: Market year counts and probabilities of market booms (three-year) and busts in the housing market 
  
40% One-Year Price Increase (Real)
T=0 T+1 T+3 T+5
Count Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Market-year counts 910 887 -              100.00% 841 -              100.00% 795 -              100.00%
40% price increase 1 -              0.11% 49 -              5.83% 118 -              14.84%
29% price decline 1 -              0.11% 18 -              2.14% 33 -              4.15%
Years with a 40% price increase 1 1 0.11% 1 0.12% 1 0.13%
40% price increase 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
29% price decline 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
Years with a 29% price decline 1 1 0.11% 1 0.12% 1 0.13%
40% price increase 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
29% price decline 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
40% Three-Year Price Increase (Real)
T=0 T+1 T+3 T+5
Count Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Three-year period counts 864 841 -              100.00% 795 -              100.00% 749 -              100.00%
40% price increase 1 -              0.12% 45 -              5.66% 112 -              14.95%
29% price decline 1 -              0.12% 16 -              2.01% 31 -              4.14%
Three-year periods with a 40%  price increase 51 51 6.06% 51 6.42% 49 6.54%
40% price increase 0 0.00% 0.00% 8 15.69% 1.01% 8 16.33% 1.07%
29% price decline 0 0.00% 0.00% 3 5.88% 0.38% 5 10.20% 0.67%
Three-year periods with a 29% price decline 18 17 2.02% 14 1.76% 14 1.87%
40% price increase 0 0.00% 0.00% 1 7.14% 0.13% 2 14.29% 0.27%
29% price decline 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
 
34 
 
Table D3: Market year counts and probabilities of market booms (five-year) and busts in the housing market 
 
  
Table D4: Market year counts and probabilities of market booms (one-year) and financial crises in the housing market 
  
40% Five-Year Price Increase (Real)
T=0 T+1 T+3 T+5
Count Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Five-year period counts 818 795 -              100.00% 749 -              100.00% 703 -              100.00%
40% price increase 1 -              0.13% 41 -              5.47% 106 -              15.08%
29% price decline 1 -              0.13% 16 -              2.14% 29 -              4.13%
Five-year periods with a real price increase 121 120 15.09% 117 15.62% 97 13.80%
40% price increase 1 0.83% 0.13% 11 9.40% 1.47% 19 19.59% 2.70%
29% price decline 0 0.00% 0.00% 8 6.84% 1.07% 8 8.25% 1.14%
Five-year periods with a 29% price decline 34 32 4.03% 32 4.27% 32 4.55%
40% price increase 0 0.00% 0.00% 3 9.38% 0.40% 9 28.13% 1.28%
29% price decline 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
40% One-Year Price Increase (Real)
T=0 T+1 T+3 T+5
Count Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Market-year counts 879 857 -              100.00% 813 -              100.00% 769 -              100.00%
40% price increase 0 -              0.00% 44 -              5.41% 106 -              13.78%
Crisis (all types) 202 -              23.57% 202 -              24.85% 196 -              25.49%
Banking crisis 132 -              15.40% 132 -              16.24% 131 -              17.04%
Currency crisis 73 -              8.52% 73 -              8.98% 70 -              9.10%
Inflation crisis 10 -              1.17% 10 -              1.23% 7 -              0.91%
Sovereign debt crisis 5 -              0.58% 5 -              0.62% 5 -              0.65%
Years with a 40% price increase 0 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
40% price increase 0 NA 0.00% 0 NA 0.00% 0 NA 0.00%
Crisis (all types) 0 NA 0.00% 0 NA 0.00% 0 NA 0.00%
Banking crisis 0 NA 0.00% 0 NA 0.00% 0 NA 0.00%
Currency crisis 0 NA 0.00% 0 NA 0.00% 0 NA 0.00%
Inflation crisis 0 NA 0.00% 0 NA 0.00% 0 NA 0.00%
Sovereign debt crisis 0 NA 0.00% 0 NA 0.00% 0 NA 0.00%
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Table D5: Market year counts and probabilities of market booms (three-year) and financial crises in the housing market 
 
40% Three-Year Price Increase (Real)
T=0 T+1 T+3 T+5
Count Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Three-year period counts 835 813 -              100.00% 769 -              100.00% 725 -              100.00%
40% price increase 0 -              0.00% 40 -              5.20% 100 -              13.79%
Crisis (all types) 202 -              24.85% 196 -              25.49% 181 -              24.97%
Banking crisis 132 -              16.24% 131 -              17.04% 124 -              17.10%
Currency crisis 73 -              8.98% 70 -              9.10% 60 -              8.28%
Inflation crisis 10 -              1.23% 7 -              0.91% 4 -              0.55%
Sovereign debt crisis 5 -              0.62% 5 -              0.65% 5 -              0.69%
Three-year periods with a 40% price increase 46 46 5.66% 46 5.98% 44 6.07%
40% price increase 0 0.00% 0.00% 6 13.04% 0.78% 6 13.64% 0.83%
Crisis (all types) 6 13.04% 0.74% 14 30.43% 1.82% 18 40.91% 2.48%
Banking crisis 1 2.17% 0.12% 10 21.74% 1.30% 11 25.00% 1.52%
Currency crisis 4 8.70% 0.49% 5 10.87% 0.65% 6 13.64% 0.83%
Inflation crisis 1 2.17% 0.12% 1 2.17% 0.13% 2 4.55% 0.28%
Sovereign debt crisis 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
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Table D6: Market year counts and probabilities of market booms (five-year) and financial crises in the housing market 
 
 
40% Five-Year Price Increase (Real)
T=0 T+1 T+3 T+5
Count Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Count
Conditional 
Probability
Unconditional 
Probability
Five-year period counts 791 769 -              100.00% 725 -              100.00% 681 -              100.00%
40% price increase 0 -              0.00% 36 -              4.97% 95 -              13.95%
Crisis (all types) 196 -              25.49% 181 -              24.97% 172 -              25.26%
Banking crisis 131 -              17.04% 124 -              17.10% 115 -              16.89%
Currency crisis 70 -              9.10% 60 -              8.28% 57 -              8.37%
Inflation crisis 7 -              0.91% 4 -              0.55% 4 -              0.59%
Sovereign debt crisis 5 -              0.65% 5 -              0.69% 5 -              0.73%
Five-year periods with a 40% price increase 109 109 14.17% 108 14.90% 89 13.07%
40% price increase 0 0.00% 0.00% 8 7.41% 1.10% 16 17.98% 2.35%
Crisis (all types) 22 20.18% 2.86% 37 34.26% 5.10% 30 33.71% 4.41%
Banking crisis 10 9.17% 1.30% 25 23.15% 3.45% 20 22.47% 2.94%
Currency crisis 12 11.01% 1.56% 14 12.96% 1.93% 10 11.24% 1.47%
Inflation crisis 1 0.92% 0.13% 2 1.85% 0.28% 2 2.25% 0.29%
Sovereign debt crisis 0 0.00% 0.00% 1 0.93% 0.14% 0 0.00% 0.00%
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